This paper analyzes the impact of corporate governance on firm value using a sequence of reforms in India (Clause 49) enacted in 2000, for which more severe penalties were introduced in 2004. The reforms did not apply to all firms and resulted in treatment and control groups of firms with overlapping characteristics. A difference-in-difference approach (controlling for various factors including firm-specific time trends) shows a substantial positive causal effect of the reforms in combination with the 2004 sanction increase. A regression discontinuity analysis, focusing on the thresholds for application of the reforms, leads to similar results. Across various specifications, the estimated effect is at least 6% of firm value. This effect is large, but comparable in magnitude to effects found in other studies of major corporate governance reforms, especially in emerging markets.
INTRODUCTION
The linkages among corporate governance, stock market development, enforcement, and firm value have become subjects of intense debate within and across law, finance and economics. Despite this widespread interest, finding evidence that corporate governance causes changes in firm value has posed a significant challenge. This paper examines this question using a sequence of reforms to India's corporate governance regime as a source of exogenous variation. The analysis employs financial statement and other data from the Prowess database for a large sample of over 4000
Indian firms from 1998-2006. Our results, taken together, present evidence supporting a causal effect of the reforms on firm value. Further, by exploiting an unusual feature of the reforms (namely, that more severe sanctions were introduced years after the substantive law was enacted), our results also underscore the importance of sanctions and enforcement. The magnitude of the effect across specifications is at least 6% of firm value, which is large but comparable to effects found in studies of other major emerging markets.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows. First, compared to other studies -for instance, of the United States and Korea -the Indian legal reform provides a cleaner experiment, as we describe below. Second, our results also provide an important complement to pre-existing work on India (e.g. Black and Khanna (2007) , which explores the immediate market reaction to the initial announcement of the reforms) by examining the longer-term effects of governance reforms on firm value, incorporating subsequent developments such as the increase in sanctions in 2004.
Our analysis begins with Clause 49 (of the stock exchange listing agreement for publicly-traded corporations) which was introduced in India in 2000. Clause 49 mandated greater board independence, enhanced disclosure requirements, and increased the power of audit committees for affected firms. Importantly, however, Clause 49 did not apply to all firms, thereby giving us "treatment" groups (firms subject to Clause 49) and "control" groups (firms not subject to Clause 49). The criteria for the application of Clause 49 were backward-looking and multi-layered, being framed with reference to "paid up share capital" and "net worth." Because of this, as we discuss in greater detail below, there is considerable overlap in terms of size and other characteristics between the "treatment" and "control" groups. Further, concerns about whether firms may have endogenously chosen to be subject to the reforms (e.g., by manipulating "paid up share capital") are largely assuaged because few firms actually experience changes in these threshold variables and our results are robust to the exclusion of these firms. This provides us with quite comparable treatment and control groups as the basis for a difference-in-difference analysis.
Other attributes of the reforms in India permit us to engage in further important analyses. Because Clause 49 was framed as a change to the listing agreement, the initial penalty for violations was delisting. However, in 2004, India's securities laws were amended to introduce larger financial and criminal penalties for violations of Clause 49 on individuals and firms. The introduction of these more severe sanctions was quite separate in time from the dates on which firms became subject to the new rules. This provides an unusual opportunity to not only test the effects of the substantive law on firm value, but also to test independently for the effects of changes in sanctions and enforcement. 1 In light of these reforms, the paper's primary hypothesis concerns the impact of the 2004 sanctions on firm value (as measured by Tobin's q). The analysis uses a 1 For expositional ease we sometimes refer to these interchangeably as changes in sanctions or enforcement. Strictly speaking, the changes were sanction increases, but the literature on enforcement and stock market development often treats sanction increases as changes in enforcement or as a way to measure enforcement (Jackson and Roe, 2009; Coffee, 2007) . Of course, changes in sanctions and enforcement both affect expected sanctions.
difference-in-difference approach, comparing a treatment group of firms that were subject to Clause 49 (and hence to the new sanctions from 2004 onwards) with a control group of firms that were not subject to Clause 49 (or to its sanction and enforcement regime). The regression specification controls for various relevant factors and for firmspecific time trends in q, so that the estimated effect represents the extent to which a Clause 49 firm's value deviates from its underlying trend in q following the introduction of the sanctions, relative to the corresponding deviation for unaffected firms. The inclusion of firm specific time trends addresses the possibility that firms subject to Clause 49 would have experienced more rapid growth in firm value even in the absence of the reforms. Using this approach, the paper finds a substantial and statistically significant positive causal effect on firm value of the Clause 49 reforms in combination with the 2004 sanctions.
This basic result is robust to various checks, and in particular continues to hold when comparing only the smaller firms that were subject to Clause 49 and the larger firms amongst those that were not subject to Clause 49. These firms were very similar along many dimensions (e.g., assets, sales, exports), except that one set of firms were subject to Clause 49 and the other were not. The sharp discontinuity created by the applicability of the new rules above specific levels of paid up share capital or net worth also enables the use of a regression discontinuity approach; this leads to very similar results. Our results, taken together, present evidence supporting a causal effect of the reforms on firm value. Further, we find that the effects of the 2004 reforms are statistically stronger and larger than those associated with the initial announcement of the Clause 49 reforms and delisting sanction in 1999, thus underscoring the importance of the 2004 sanctions increase. Across various specifications and subsamples, the magnitude of the effect of the 2004 reforms amounts to at least 6% of firm value.
The paper also explores the channels through which this increase in firm value may have occurred. Over the (relatively short) post-reform sample period, there is some evidence of improvements in accounting performance and increases in foreign institutional investment (which may be associated with better monitoring), but these results are not robust across specifications. Further, there is no discernible effect of the 2004 reforms on certain measures of tunneling within business groups (using the approach developed by Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002) ). Overall, it appears that the increase in firm value in 2004 capitalized expectations of longer-term benefits of the reforms, but a better understanding of the precise channels through which this effect operated awaits further study once more years of post-reform data are available.
Thus, this paper brings new evidence to bear on the general questions surrounding corporate governance, stock market development, enforcement, and firm value noted above. As emphasized above, an important element of this paper's contribution is the use of a reform that generated relatively comparable treatment and control groups of firms. Previous quasi-experimental studies (e.g, of the US) often face the concern that governance reforms apply to all firms, making it difficult to isolate a credible control group (although there are important exceptions, such as the use of state antitakeover laws by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) ). 2 Our study provides credible control and treatment groups in a market where there is substantial variation in governance practices. It also reflects the broadening of attention from the analysis of substantive laws to a consideration of their enforcement (e.g. Jackson and Roe, 2009 ). This paper is also related to studies of the Korean corporate governance reforms of the 1990's. Black, Kim, Jang, and Park (2005) and Black, Jang and Kim (2006) 2 An alternative approach to addressing the issue of causation is the use of cross-country analysis (e.g. Durnev and Kim, 2005) . This approach is particularly associated with the influential strand of scholarship (beginning with the seminal work of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) ) focusing on the historical origins of a country's legal system. The importance of legal origins has, however, recently been questioned (for a discussion in the Indian context, see Armour and Lele (2009) ). construct a Korean corporate governance index (KCGI), which they use to study the effects of governance on Korean firms. They examine the effect of the KCGI on firm value, instrumenting for the KCGI using an asset size variable that captures the threshold (at 2 trillion won) for the application of the reforms. 3 They find positive effects -for instance, Black, Jang and Kim (2006) estimate that a Korean reform that required firms above a size threshold to appoint at least 50% outside directors increased Tobin's q by 0.13. However, as the asset size instrument is not time-varying, their analysis does not allow for firm fixed effects. This paper uses a difference-in-difference analysis and panel data, and allows not only for year and firm fixed effects, but also for firm-specific time trends. The latter is especially important because differential time trends in value for the larger firms affected by a reform, relative to the smaller unaffected firms, is an important concern in both the Korean and Indian reforms. This paper also contributes more specifically to the empirical evaluation of the Indian governance reforms. Black and Khanna (2007) conduct an event study of the adoption of Clause 49 using an empirical strategy based on the phased implementation schedule (large firms were expected to comply before medium-sized firms, which were expected to comply before small firms). They find positive abnormal returns around the first important regulatory announcement for firms expected to comply early, relative to firms expected to comply later. This paper uses a very different approach. First, it examines the effects of the reforms on firm value over a longer time horizon, and can thus incorporate the effects of later reforms such as the sanctions introduced in 2004.
Second, it employs a different empirical strategy, using firms completely unaffected by the reforms as a control group. To the limited extent that the questions addressed by the two papers overlap, our findings are broadly consistent with Black and Khanna (2007) .
In particular, we find a positive effect of the initial announcement of the reforms in 1999 that is similar in magnitude to their result. However, the central question analyzed in our study -the impact of the 2004 sanctions reform -is not addressed at all in Black and Khanna (2007) , which only uses stock price data for 1999.
Part II details the development of corporate governance reform in India while laying out the groundwork for our empirical tests. Part III describes the data. Part IV elaborates on the empirical specifications and hypotheses. Part V reports the results and robustness checks. Part VI discusses the results, and Part VII concludes.
II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM IN INDIA: THE RISE OF CLAUSE 49.
India, unlike a number of emerging markets, has had actively functioning stock markets since 1875 and a fairly detailed corpus of corporate and securities laws (Khanna, 2009a) . However, prior to the governance reforms described below, Indian corporate governance in practice was considered weak and quite dysfunctional.
Inconsistent disclosure and largely ineffective boards of directors led to a failing system of governance in which insider diversion was not uncommon. Indeed, Indian firms looking for capital had to rely primarily on internal sources or on the capital provided by various arms of the government, rather than the stock market (for more details see Khanna (2009a) Khanna (2009a) ), but for our purposes it is sufficient to note that Clause 49 was aimed at making Boards and Audit Committees more independent, powerful and focused monitors of management. Moreover, Clause 49 enhanced disclosure, which would also aid institutional investors and other shareholders in monitoring management.
Importantly, Clause 49 was not intended to apply to all publicly traded and listed firms in India, with firms falling below certain thresholds being completely exempt from its provisions. Further, Clause 49 was not expected to be implemented immediately. Rather, it provided a phased-in implementation schedule where certain firms (essentially large ones) were expected to comply earlier than mid-sized firms which were expected to comply earlier than small firms (however, firms that listed for the first time from 2000 onwards were expected to comply immediately, regardless of whether they fell into any of the categories described below). Specifically,
1.
Firms that were listed on the Bombay (Mumbai) Stock Exchange (BSE) under the listing flag "A" were expected to comply by March 31, 2001 . These are generally the largest corporations in the Indian economy, and are referred to in the remainder of the paper as "Group 1" firms.
2.
Firms that were outside this group, but had paid up share capital of at least Rs.
10 crores (roughly US$2,500,000) 4 or net worth of at least Rs. 25 crores (roughly US$6,250,000) at any time in the companyʹs history, were expected to comply by March 31, 2002. These firms are referred to below as "Group 2" firms.
3.
Finally, other firms with paid up share capital of at least Rs. 3 crores (roughly US$750,000) were expected to comply by March 31, 2003; these firms are referred to below as "Group 3" firms.
[ Figure 1 about here]
This sequence of reforms is illustrated by the timeline in Figure 1 . Black and Khanna, 2010) suggests that compliance with the provisions of Clause 49 is far from universal, although the majority of firms subject to the rules appear to be in compliance. In any event, noncompliance would only make it more difficult to detect any effect of the reforms.
III. DATA
The data for this study is obtained from Prowess, a database that is maintained by the Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE (1)
The book value of debt is proxied by the Prowess variable "borrowings," and the book value of preferred stock by the Prowess variable "preference capital." The book, rather than market, value of preferred stock is used because preferred stock is very thinly traded, if at all. The market value of common stock uses data from Prowess on share prices and on the number of common shares outstanding. The share price is calculated as the 365-day average of the daily stock prices reported in Prowess. 9 The denominator 7 Note that the results are robust to restricting the sample to those firms that remain in the dataset until the end of the sample period (i.e. 2006). This robustness check, along with all others that are noted but not reported in the paper, is provided in an Internet Appendix available at: http://www.law.umich.edu/facultyhome/Vikramaditya_Khanna. 8 For instance, the sanctions introduced in October, 2004 are assumed to affect Prowess variables reported for 2004. This relies on the premise that the Indian stock market fairly rapidly incorporates new information into share prices. Evidence for this is provided in Griffin, Kelly & Nardari (2007) . More generally, this evidence also provides some support for inferring the long-term value of Indian firms from market responses, as reflected in Tobin's q. It is possible that market responses may be influenced by irrational investor sentiment ("fads"). Our results, however, would not be confounded by a general fad for Indian firms, because of the difference-in-difference approach described in Section IV below. They are also robust to the existence of a fad for large Indian firms, as our results survive when comparing smaller firms that were differentially affected by the reforms. 9 The 365-day average is used because using the December 31 price (to correspond to the Prowess financial statement variables) may be subject to seasonal factors, or to a high degree of randomness due, for instance, to infrequent trading. The use of the 365-day average tends to bias against the paper's findings -e.g., the estimated response of q to a legal change in October of 2004 would understate the effect, as q is averaged over all of 2004, while investors could uses the Prowess variable "total assets." To address some obvious outliers, q is Winsorized at 5% and 95%. Various alternative formulations of q are used in robustness checks, but lead to similar results. 10 The central independent variable of interest captures the application of the Clause 49 rules and sanctions provisions. As was pointed out in the discussion above, the implementation of Clause 49 took place through a number of steps (illustrated in Figure 1 ). In 1999, the set of firms that would eventually be subject to Clause 49 was identified. However, compliance was not expected to be immediate, as noted in Part II. However, it is possible to identify those firms that enter the Prowess dataset in 2000 or a subsequent year; these firms can be presumed to be newly-listed, and so are classified only respond to the change (if it was unanticipated) in or after October. Some smaller firms have low share trading liquidity. However, the results are robust to excluding those firm-years with low liquidity (specifically, firm-years with missing monthly price data in Prowess for any month within the year). 10 The formulation in Eq. (1) corresponds closely to standard definitions of q in the literature (e.g. Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Desai and Dharmapala, 2009) , with some caveats. First, deferred tax liability is omitted in Eq. (1); however, a definition of q incorporating deferred tax liability is used in robustness checks and leads to similar results. Second, it is possible that some recently-issued debt is omitted by Prowess in its "borrowings" variable and reported instead as "current liabilities." To address this possibility, the basic analysis uses current liabilities as a control variable, and a definition of q incorporating current liabilities is used in robustness checks. In particular, redefining q to include both current liabilities and borrowings in the book value of debt and redefining q to include only current liabilities in the book value of debt (i.e. excluding borrowing) both lead to similar results. In addition, Winsorizing q at 1% and 99% (rather than 5% and 95%), defining q to include deferred tax liabilities, excluding the book value of preferred stock, and using the market-to-book ratio all lead to highly consistent results. 11 Prowess reports the "year of incorporation," but this does not necessarily correspond to the year in which the firm first became a publicly traded corporation. The firm may have been formed ("incorporated") in one year and the promoters may have decided to list it as a publicly traded firm at a later point in time.
as being subject to Clause 49 from the first year in which they enter the dataset. 12 The results are robust, however, to omitting these new firms, or to reclassifying them as not being subject to Clause 49.
Given that the enforcement provisions were introduced in 2004, after Groups 1, 2 and 3 were all supposed to be in compliance, the basic analysis uses a simpler, nontime-varying indicator (denoted CL49i) that takes on the value 1 if firm i was subject to 2) below). 14 An obvious concern with this paper's empirical design is the comparability of those firms that were subject to Clause 49 and those that were not. Table 1 Considered together, Clause 49 firms are considerably larger, for example in terms of mean asset size, than non-Clause 49 firms. This is primarily attributable, however, to 12 Admittedly, this introduces some possibility of misclassification by Prowess; however, the results do not depend on how these new firms are treated in the analysis. 13 A caveat to this characterization is that there are a few firms that experienced changes in paid-up share capital that caused them to become subject to Clause 49 after 2003 (e.g. a firm whose paid-up share capital increased from 2 to 3.5 crores in 2005 -typically due to a seasoned equity offering -would have become subject to the new rules in 2005, but would not have been subject in 2004 or previous years). For this reason, CL49i (or more precisely CL49it) varies over time to a limited degree. However, there is relatively little change in paid-up share capital over time for a given firm, so this issue only affects a very small number of firms. Omitting these firms from the sample leads to substantially similar results. 14 The variable representing the applicability of the reforms is thus a deterministic function of a number of observable variables -net worth, paid-up share capital, year and whether the firm is newly-listed. Thus, it is not feasible to use a nonparametric matching procedure to analyze the impact of the reforms, as there is no variation in "treatment" when controlling for these observable variables.
Group 1 and Group 2 firms, rather than to Group 3 firms (defined by Clause 49 as those with paid-up share capital exceeding Rs. 3 crores (roughly US$750,000)). If attention is restricted to the non-Clause 49 firms that fall just below the Rs. 3 crore cutoff (Group 4), 15 then these firms and the Group 3 firms have very similar mean asset size.
[ Table 1 EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 15 In Table 1 (and the analysis below), the cutoff for defining "larger" non-Clause 49 firms is formulated to include all firms that had a maximum value of paid-up share capital (at any point in the sample period) exceeding Rs. 1.5 crores but below 3 crores. Note, though, that there is relatively little change in paid-up share capital over time for a given firm.
In testing the hypothesis that stronger enforcement provisions that took effect in 2004 (i.e. Section 23E, which applied only to those firms subject to Clause 49) led to an increase in firm value, the basic empirical specification is the following:
where qit is Tobin's q (defined as in Eq. (1) The basic approach used in Eq. (2) is a difference-in-difference approach where the hypothesis is that β > 0, with Clause 49 firms constituting the "treatment" group and unaffected firms the "control" group. An important class of alternative explanations for any increase in firm value among Clause 49 firms is that, being larger and presumably more successful, these firms may have experienced more rapid growth in value for reasons unrelated to the reforms. Thus, it is vital to include (in addition to firm fixed effects and year effects) the firm-specific time trends git; here, gi represents the firmspecific growth rate in q for firm i. 16 Hence, the estimated effect β represents the extent to which a Clause 49 firm's value deviates from its underlying trend following the reforms, relative to the corresponding deviation for unaffected firms.
Xit is a vector of control variables. In the basic specification, it includes the following. Revenue from exports is often viewed as a particularly powerful sign of successful performance by Indian firms, so total exports are included. A number of variables are included to correct for potential mismeasurement of q. Because the full book value of debt may not be captured by the "borrowings" variable in Prowess (see above), current liabilities are included as a control. Intangible assets may be poorly measured in the book value of assets (the denominator in Eq. (1)), so research and development (R&D) expenditures are included (and defined as the sum of R&D on the capital account and R&D on the current account), along with advertising expenses. All of these control variables are scaled by sales to control for changes in firm size over time; the results are essentially identical when sales is also included as a control, and when exports, current liabilities, R&D and advertising expense are included in unscaled form.
Finally, to control for changes over time in the risk associated with a firm's stock, a measure of stock price volatility (using monthly data on firms' stock prices) is also included. For firm i in year t, it represents the standard deviation of firm i's monthly price across the months of year t; this is annualized, and scaled by firm i's mean (annual) stock price in year t. A number of additional control variables are used in robustness checks, as described below.
The specification in Eq. (2) can be implemented using estimation in first differences (see Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 315-316) . 17 This involves estimating:
where Δqit = qit -qi,t-1, and other changes are defined analogously; ζt is the year effect and ηit the error term in the first-differenced model (representing the changes in δt and νit , respectively). Note that the firm effect μi in Eq. (2) drops out of Eq. (3). However, the firm-specific trend gi can be estimated by including a firm effect in the estimation of Eq. 
V. RESULTS

V.1) Basic Results and Robustness Checks
The results using the specification described above are reported in Table 2 . In the first column, the specification is that in Eq. (3), excluding the firm-specific trend gi (and hence essentially equivalent to a model with firm and year effects). Using the full dataset of over 4000 firms over the period 1998-2006, there is a positive and statistically significant association between the 2004 reforms and firm value (this and all subsequent results use robust (White, 1980) standard errors that are clustered at the firm level, which also helps address issues that may arise from serial correlation (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004) ). Adding firm-specific time trends (Column 2) does not substantively change this result. In Column 3, the basic set of controls is added. While this reduces the sample size considerably due to the unavailability of data on some of the controls, 18 the basic result is strengthened: stronger sanctions appears to lead to a positive effect on the value of affected firms (relative to unaffected firms), and this effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. The magnitude of this effect is also substantial:
the estimated coefficient implies an increase in q of over 0.09, which is over 10% of the mean value of q (0.88) in the dataset.
[ Table 2 about here]
Moreover, the effect appears to be specifically related to the reforms in 2004, as opposed to the wider environment associated with Clause 49. The initial announcement of Clause 49 with the delisting sanction occurred in 1999, when the Birla Committee (KMBC) report specified which categories of firms would be subject to the new rules.
Column 4 shows that Clause 49 firms seem to have experienced an increase in value in 18 Note that the results reported in Columns 1 and 2 for the larger sample are robust to restricting the sample to the smaller one used in Columns 3 and 4 of The basic result is robust to a variety of checks. The set of firms in the basic sample includes government-owned firms (SOEs) and firms in which foreign corporations own controlling stakes (as the reforms in theory applied to them as well).
However, it might be the case that foreign-controlled firms follow home country governance rules, and so are unlikely to be affected by the reforms. Further, SOEs may in practice be insulated from the reforms or from their enforcement, and in any event may not solely be motivated by profit maximization (Goswami, 2003) . However, the results are robust to omitting foreign-controlled and government-controlled firms from the sample. Table 2 Adding the time-varying variable Rit, which reflects the nominal applicability of Clause 49 provisions to firm i in year t, also does not affect the large and significant coefficient on the Section 23E variable. Furthermore, the coefficient on Rit is indistinguishable from zero, suggesting that the nominal duty to comply with Clause 49 had little impact on firm value. This is not surprising, given that the initial impact of Clause 49 designation is likely to have been capitalized in 1999. Thereafter, the difference between e.g., Group 1 and Group 2 firms (which amounts to only one year's difference in the date by which the firm is expected to comply) is unlikely to be important.
value is that q may be affected by forward-looking information about firms' future prospects that is observable to investors but not to the researcher. These unobservable factors can be proxied by future sales growth (computed as the change in sales from year t to year (t + 1), divided by sales in year t). Adding this variable to the specification leads to highly consistent results.
Another possible explanation for an increase in q for Clause 49 firms may be a decline in the book value of assets for these firms in 2004 (possibly induced by the reforms, if firms were previously exaggerating their book value). However, the book value of assets did not fall differentially in 2004 for Clause 49 firms (indeed, the difference-in-difference point estimate is positive, albeit insignificant). Another possible explanation could be that the non-Clause 49 firms are more debt dependent than Clause 49 firms and that this may influence q. However, the results are robust to controlling directly for leverage, by adding the ratio of debt to assets as a control variable. The results are also robust to excluding firm-years with negative profits, which may represent firms in financial distress.
It was noted earlier that Clause 49 applied to all newly-listed firms from the date of listing. However, these new firms cannot be identified with certainty in the Prowess data. In the basic analysis, all firms that enter the dataset after 1999 are classified as Clause 49 firms. While this introduces the possibility of misclassification, excluding these new firms leads to an estimated effect that is almost identical to that in Table 2 (and in any event the number of firms involved is only 30, out of 2596 in the sample in Column 3 of Table 2 ). Moreover, the results are also robust to reclassifying these firms as part of the non-Clause 49 group. 20
20 Net worth prior to 1998 cannot be observed in this dataset, so it is possible that some firms that had net worth below Rs. 25 crores for the entire 1998-2006 period, but had net worth that exceeded Rs. 25 crores in some prior year, could be misclassified as non-Clause 49 firms when they were in fact subject to the rules. Note, however, that it is quite rare for firms to experience declines in net worth from above to below 25 crores (this represents about 2% of A significant number of Indian firms were listed on European or US stock markets in the years prior to the Clause 49 reforms. If the aim behind cross-listing is to signal or commit to superior governance practices, then it would seem that cross-listed firms should not be included within the treatment group of firms affected by the reforms. We identify a list of 207 firms in the Prowess dataset that are known to have cross-listed in Europe or the US by the end of 2004. 21 The basic results are robust to the exclusion of these cross-listed firms.
V.2) Alternative Treatment and Control Groups
The central challenge associated with inferring the causal impact of the reforms is of course the ability to identify a valid comparison group for those firms subject to the reforms. The control group of unaffected firms in the analysis so far includes all nonClause 49 firms. As shown in Table 1 , however, these firms are on average much smaller than the Clause 49 firms. For a variety of reasons, these smaller firms may not constitute good controls for the Clause 49 firms. One approach to addressing this problem is to restrict attention to those non-Clause 49 firms that are relatively close to the cutoff for the applicability of Clause 49. Column 1 of Table 3 reports the results using a sample that excludes Group 5 firms (those with a maximum value of paid-up share capital below Rs. 1.5 crores (roughly US$375,000)). The basic result remains significant, and the coefficient is even larger than in the basic specification.
As discussed above, there were three groups of firms subject to Clause 49: a small group of very large firms (with listing flag "A" on the BSE) that were expected to comply in 2001 (Group 1), a larger group of medium-sized firms that were expected to comply in 2002 (Group 2), and a large group of smaller firms that were expected to observations in the estimating sample), and so presumably this would also have been rare prior to the sample period. 5 crores) . Again, the results are highly robust. Finally, Column 3 of Table 3 also excludes the medium-sized firms (Group 2). This reduces the sample by a further 1073 firms (in addition to the 165 Group 1 firms that are already excluded). The remaining group of Clause 49 firms (Group 3) is highly comparable in terms of asset size and other characteristics to the control group (Group 4). 22 Even in this setting, the basic result is robust, and indeed the coefficient is larger in magnitude than in Table 2. 23 22 Even among a set of firms with roughly similar asset sizes, there may remain a concern that the fact that some of these firms have larger paid up share capital could confound the results. However, for this to confound the results, it would have to be the case that firms that had higher paid up share capital at the time of incorporation or when shares were issued would have therefore experienced an increase in q (unrelated to the Clause 49 reforms) in 2004, relative to firms that had lower original paid up share capitalization, but similar asset size as of 2004. Clearly, this seems highly unlikely, especially given the various controls employed for changes in firm characteristics in 2004. Moreover, it should be remembered that the analysis allows for firm-specific trends in q, and so even firms of very different sizes can serve as reasonable controls, as long as their trends in q are not affected by some other confounding factor that coincides with the reforms. 23 An alternative approach to analyzing the impact of Section 23E is to conduct an event study around October 12, 2004 (the date the new sanctions regime came into effect). However, there are a number of important caveats that render this approach less than conclusive in this context. First, most small firms in our sample (and hence most nonClause 49 firms) tend to trade relatively infrequently, so the size of the control group on or around the event date is quite small. Second, there is some uncertainty about the relevant event date (i.e. when the market would have come to learn of the higher sanctions): while the new sanctions came into effect on October 12, 2004, there does not appear to be a newspaper story about them on that date. Notwithstanding these caveats, we conduct an event study as a further robustness check, using a market model regression that compares: (i) the smallest Clause 49 firms (Group 3 firms) and (ii) non-Clause 49 firms with paid up capital above Rs. 1.5 crores. To address the uncertainty about the event date, we consider event windows spanning a few days around the reform. Our results indicate that abnormal returns for the smallest Clause 49 firms are positive across most event windows. However, this effect is generally not statistically significant (which is not surprising, given that the number of non-Clause 49 firms with returns on the relevant event dates is only 30). Thus, even with the various concerns noted above, the results of the event study are basically consistent with (or, at the very least, not inconsistent with) our primary results. Both of the concerns highlighted above are either not present or present to a much lesser degree in the event study in Black and Khanna (2007) . It is important to clarify the differences between the Black and Khanna (2007) event study and the event study described in this footnote. Black and Khanna (2007) analyze the market reaction to the initial announcement of the Clause 49 reforms in 1999. Their empirical design uses the variation in expected year of compliance across firms, with firms expected to comply later serving as the control group. In contrast, the event study reported in this footnote analyzes the market reaction to the new sanctions regime introduced in 2004, using non-Clause 49 firms as the control group. Thus, the Black and Khanna (2007) Table 4 suggest that the increase in the value of Clause 49 firms is not attributable to the entry of CalPERS or other foreign institutions into the Indian market.
Finally, another way to check that the estimated effect is due to the reforms rather than to some other confounding factor is through "false experiments." The basic idea underlying this test is that if the estimated effect is detectable in years other than Tables 2 and 3 is attributable to Section 23E rather than to some other confounding factor.
[ Table 4 about here]
V.4) A Regression Discontinuity Approach
As described above, the difference-in-difference analysis shows a large and robust positive effect of the combination of Clause 49 and the strong penalties embodied in Section 23E on firm value. The sharp discontinuity created by the rules governing whether a firm is subject to Clause 49 enables the use of an alternative technique: a regression discontinuity approach. This focuses more specifically on the year in which the reform occurred and on the effect around the cutoffs for Clause 49.
Thus, the regression discontinuity approach can address any remaining concerns about whether the effect primarily occurred in years after 2004, or whether it was driven by firms that are far from the cutoffs at which the reforms were applied.
A basic regression discontinuity analysis would focus on the cross-section of firm values in 2004. However, as we have longitudinal data, it is possible to construct a stricter test of the hypothesis by estimating a first-differenced regression discontinuity (FD-RD) model (e.g. Lemieux and Milligan, 2008) . The advantage of the firstdifferenced specification is that it effectively controls for unobservables that may affect a firm's average level of q. The specification is: and Section 23E at the thresholds specified in Eq. (5)). In the reported results in Table 5 , f(si,2004, wi) is assumed to be linear in si,2004 and wi; however, the results are similar when using a flexible polynomial functional form for f (si,2004, wi) . Table 5 reports the results of the FD-RD analysis. In Column 1, the estimated treatment effect (corresponding to β in Eq. (4)) is approximately 0.05, which is somewhat smaller but nonetheless comparable in magnitude to the difference-indifference estimate, though only of borderline statistical significance. However, the sample in Column 1 includes all firms, including very large and very small firms that are far from the Clause 49 thresholds. In Column 2, Clause 49 firms in Group 1 (the very large firms with listing flag "A") and non-Clause 49 firms in Group 5 (with maximum paid-up share capital below 1.5 crores) are omitted; the estimated effect is larger and highly significant. This is especially notable because the FD-RD analysis only uses data from 2004; thus, it appears that the difference-in-difference estimate is not driven by changes in q in subsequent years (which may potentially be unrelated to Section 23E).
Moreover, this effect does not exist for the same subsamples in other years -for "false observations, the estimated effect is within-industry, and there are only 129 industry groups in Column 5). Nonetheless, the estimate is still large, and is of borderline statistical significance.
[ Table 5 about here]
VI. DISCUSSION
The results reported in Section V suggest that the stronger sanctions established in 2004 led to a significant increase in the value of affected firms relative to that of unaffected firms. Across the various specifications and subsamples detailed earlier, this effect amounts to at least 6% of firm value (an increase in q of at least about 0.05, relative to the overall sample mean of q of 0.88). In some specifications, the estimate implies an effect as large as 14% (an increase in q of as much as 0.12). This is thus clearly a substantial effect. However, it is by no means implausibly large in the wider context of the literature on major corporate governance reforms, especially in emerging market settings. For example, Black, Jang and Kim (2006) estimate that a Korean reform that required firms above a size threshold to appoint at least 50% outside directors increased q by 0.13, a magnitude larger than most of our estimates. Our effect is also broadly comparable in magnitude to estimated effects for certain subsets of U.S. firms. 27
This conclusion leads to the question of the mechanism through which the enactment of sanctions affected firm value. The most obvious possibility is that the prospect of public enforcement actions deterred insiders from engaging in various forms of diversion. However, there were no enforcement or investigation proceedings Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) analyze the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on subgroups of U.S. firms that were less compliant with the Act's provisions prior to its enactment. For these firms, they estimate a positive abnormal return upon the Act's announcement in the range of 6%-20%. Thus, our estimated effect of the 2004 reforms in India, while quite large in magnitude, is well within the range of estimated effects found in the literature. 28 See Ashish Rukhaiyar, Navratnas Join Listing Rule Violators, THE ECONOMIC TIMES, 13 Sept., 2007; SEBI Pulls up 20 Clause 49 Violators, THE ECONOMIC TIMES, 12 Sept., 2007 . Khanna (2009b also argues that the support for the reforms among many Indian firms and the CII may have led investors to expect compliance with the new rules, even with relatively sparse public enforcement (relative to a scenario in which the reforms were imposed on unwilling firms).
the prospect of formal enforcement alone fully explains the results. However, it is not uncommon in India for enforcement efforts to occur a few years after the promulgation of new rules (Khanna, 2009b Another possible explanation is that the enactment of more severe sanctions may have signaled an increase in reputational sanctions -i.e., that investors were more concerned with governance issues and would punish poor governance practices more severely than before. While the crucial role of the precise thresholds for Clause 49 applicability -especially in the regression discontinuity analysis -seems to support the importance of formal enforcement, it is possible that reputational sanctions may also be closely tied to these thresholds, if for instance disclosures required by Clause 49 enable investors to obtain the information necessary to monitor firms' governance practices.
Thus, formal and informal enforcement mechanisms may interact and complement each other; disentangling their separate effects remains a task for future research.
It is also possible to examine in more detail the specific channels through which firm value may have increased, although the post-reform data we have is only for two
years. An obvious potential channel is through improvements in accounting performance. There is some evidence suggesting that accounting performance (defined as "profits before depreciation, taxes and interest" or PBDIT) improved for Clause 49 firms (relative to non-Clause 49 firms) upon the introduction of Section 23E. However, this result is not robust to the inclusion of firm-specific trends in PBDIT.
As argued above, the Indian corporate governance reforms were not externally imposed, but rather driven by the affected firms themselves. Therefore, one may ask why firms appear not to have been optimizing their corporate governance arrangements prior to the reforms. There are reasons to believe that mandatory governance rules are more effective than voluntary arrangements. Mandatory rules that are backed by external public or private enforcement mechanisms enable controlling shareholders and insiders to make credible commitments to minority shareholders that they will not engage in diversion. Such rules may thus play an important role in improving governance: in their absence, even controlling shareholders who are eager to adopt better governance practices may have difficulty convincing investors that they are serious about implementing these practices. This can explain why we find a substantial effect of the reforms, even though the reforms were supported by many of the firms (i.e. their controlling shareholders and insiders).
In seeking governance reforms, firms appear to have been motivated in large part by the desire to gain greater access to capital, and especially to foreign institutional investment (Khanna, 2009a) . Thus, a natural question to address is whether the reforms had the desired impact -i.e. whether foreign institutional investment (FII) rose in those firms affected by Section 23E (relative to unaffected firms) and whether that might affect firm value by bringing in potentially better monitors. There is some evidence suggesting that there was an increase in FII for Clause 49 firms (relative to non-Clause 49 firms) upon the introduction of Section 23E. Again, however, this result is not robust to the inclusion of firm-specific trends in FII. More generally, the difficulties associated with identifying specific channels through which the corporate governance reforms affected firm value is not surprising.
The post-reform sample period is short, and the increase in firm value does not necessarily imply that these types of changes would occur in the short run. Rather, it is possible that the increase in q reflected a capitalization of longer-term improvements in the environment facing minority shareholders. We leave further exploration of these issues for future research, when more extensive post-reform data is available.
VII. CONCLUSION
While there has been extensive discussion across the fields of economics, law and finance of the effects of corporate governance, the central challenge has been to find credible evidence of a causal impact of governance practices on firm value, financial development, and the wider process of economic development. This paper uses a sequence of corporate governance reforms in India as a source of exogenous variation.
These reforms had several unusual features that facilitate identification of this causal effect. In particular, a large group of firms was exempted from the reforms, and the complex rules for the application of the reforms created considerable overlap in the characteristics of affected and unaffected firms. Moreover, the introduction of more severe financial penalties for the violation of the new corporate governance rules took place after the rules were already in force, thus decoupling the effects of substantive legal rules and of increased sanctions.
Using this set of reforms, this paper finds a large and statistically significant positive effect (amounting to at least 6% of firm value) of the governance reforms in combination with the sanctions. The primary contribution of the paper is thus to add to the very limited body of causal evidence for the proposition that corporate governance affects firm value. Moreover, the paper also highlights the role of sanctions and enforcement -the substantive legal rules are shown to have a fairly weak effect until the enactment of more severe sanctions. However, results on the specific channels through which the effect operated are inconclusive, perhaps because of the limited post-reform data that is currently available. Further research is required to distinguish among various possible channels. 
Note: These descriptive statistics refer to the set of observations at the firm-year level for which the market price data required to compute Tobin's q exists (and which is used as the basic estimating sample in the regression analysis). Tobin's q is defined as in Eq.
(1), and is Winsorized at 5% and 95%. "(Clause 49)*(Section23E)" is an interaction term between an indicator for those firms that were subject to Clause 49 at any stage (including newly listed firms from 2000 onwards) and an indicator for the years in which Section 23E applied (2004) (2005) (2006) . All other variables are as described in the text. Groups 1-3 were subject to the Clause 49 reforms, as described in the text. Group 4 firms (those with maximum paid-up share capital between Rs. 1.5 and 3 crores) and Group 5 firms (those with maximum paid-up share capital below Rs. 1.5 crores) were not. The summary statistics for Groups 3 and 4 are emphasized here because these groups are highly comparable in observable characteristics, while being affected differentially by the reforms. 
Note:
The dependent variable is the change in Tobin's q, where q is defined as in Eq. (1) and is Winsorized at 5% and 95%. The independent variable of interest is an interaction term between an indicator for those firms that were subject to Clause 49 at any stage (including newly listed firms from 2000 onwards) and an indicator for the years in which Section 23E applied (2004) (2005) (2006) . "(Clause 49-firm)*(KMBC)" is an interaction term between an indicator for those firms that were subject to Clause 49 at any stage (including newly listed firms from 2000 onwards) and an indicator for the years after the Birla Committee report (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) . Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The dependent variable is the change in Tobin's q, where q is defined as in Eq.
(1) and is Winsorized at 5% and 95%. The independent variable of interest is an interaction term between an indicator for those firms that were subject to Clause 49 at any stage (including newly listed firms from 2000 onwards) and an indicator for the years in which Section 23E applied (2004) (2005) (2006) . "Basic" controls are the same as those in Table 2 . Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The dependent variable is the change in Tobin's q, where q is defined as in Eq. (1) and is Winsorized at 5% and 95%. The independent variable of interest in Columns 1 and 2 is an interaction term between an indicator for those firms that were subject to Clause 49 at any stage (including newly listed firms from 2000 onwards) and an indicator for the years in which Section 23E applied (2004) (2005) (2006) . "Basic" controls are the same as those in Table 2 ; other variables are as defined in the text. Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The dependent variable is the change in Tobin's q for the specified years, where q is defined as in Eq.
(1) and is Winsorized at 5% and 95%. The independent variable of interest is an indicator for those firms that were subject to Clause 49 as of 2003 (including newly listed firms from 2000 onwards). "Basic" controls are the same as those in Table 2 . Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
